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I. PAST HISTORY *ND FR^SNT STATUS OF PLANNING 
ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
1© Past history 
The need for a development planning policy has only recently been 
recognized in Latin America as the result of a combination of internal and 
external factors» 
During the forties,, the need to enlarge the economic infrastructure# 
particularly the transport network and power supply, and adapt it to new 
development conditions* as well as to encourage relatively large-scale 
projects in key industries led to the preparation and implementation of 
some partial programmes dependent mainly on public investment® 
Subsequently, particularly towards the end of the fifties, it 
became increasingly apparent that the Latin American economies lacked the 
necessary dynamism to maintain moderately satisfactory rates of growth, 
to remedy critical imbalances in their foreign trade and external financing, 
to contain inflationary pressures, to provide sufficient productive 
employment for a rapidly increasing labour force, and to improve living 
conditions and at the same time fulfil rising expectations created by a 
knowledge of the tremendous possibilities brought about by technological 
advances» Economic policy thus came to hinge on development, in its most 
comprehensive sense as an economic and social concept encompassing both 
internal and external limitations. Furthermore S3LA, whose objectives 
are to analyse the development problems of Latin America, suggest 
technical norms for a development programme and methods of projecting 
future needs, helped to instil that more comprehensive outlook, while its 
work was focussed more on analysis than on planning, the increasing 
use of projections as a method of anticipating certain problems and 
analysing policy alternatives, helped to lay the groundwork and provide 
a methodological tool for the preparations of plans. 
Bolivia, Chile and Colombia were the first Latin American countries 
in this decade to formulate national development plans and to establish 
the necessary machinery, largely with the help of international technical 
assistance» However, it was not until the Punta del "¿ste Conference in 1961, 
/that the 
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that the Latin American Governments recognized that planning should be 
the fundamental instrument for mobilizing national resources bringing 
about necessary structural changes, enhancing efficiency and productivity 
and securing more international financial co-operation» 
Since then, virtually all the Latin American countries have prepaed 
plans of différait kinds and scope, it the same time, the plans have 
been analyzed and assessed by regional organs which have helped to sustain 
planning efforts by bringing them into line with the volume and orientation 
of foreign financial assistance» 
A valuable fund of experience has thus been built up, but its true 
significance may be hard to appreciate because planning is a relatively 
reGsnt phenomenon and because it began in very special sircumstances* 
Until fairly recently, no experience had been obtained in this field, 
apart from some preliminary experiments and certain sectoral programmes, 
and the very idea of planning was resisted. There was no background data 
on which to draw for planning purposes, and no methodology that had 
already proved its worth in the particular circumstances of Latin America 
Nor was ther-e a flexible actoinistrative structure which could be adapted 
to functions and methods other than those enshrined by custom and 
tradition» Nonetheless, this period was marked by the preparation of the 
technical bases for planning and the training of cadres on an ever-
increasing scale» All the countries now have the necessary machinery 
for the preparation and orientation of plans (offices and general plans); 
the criteria used in the allocation of resources are becoming more 
rational, especially in the public sector, last but not least, planning 
iv.o become a widely accepted idea. 
An account will be given below of some of the main features of 
these developments* which certainly denote a period of great progress« 
Further improvements upon the progress already achieved will, however, 
meet with a number of obstacles and limitations that have been emerging, 
and this suggests the need for a second stage in which more workable systems 
of plaining would be set up, participation in the preparation of the plans 




effective planning would be carried out»—' The second part of this 
paper will review these shortcomings and obstacles, and pinpoint in 
greater detail the internal and external factors that are hampering the 
execution of the plans». Lastly, it will draw a few general conclusions 
which may help to overcome some of the problems discussed® 
2. Planning organs 
Recognition of the need for planning was immediately followed by 
the establishment of planning offices in the countries where they still 
did not exist. By now, they are to be found in every Latin American 
country, and in one case - that of Uruguay - the existence of the planning 
office has been formally acknowledged in the Constitution. 
As planning is a new function of Government, the first task to be 
undertaken was the establishment of special planning organs. The nucleus 
was formed by the central planning offices, which evolved in different 
ways depending on the extent to x^ hich they were accepted as part of 
the traditional structure of government. Generally speaking, they were 
established in such a way as to become directly responsible to the 
Office of the President of the Republic. In some cases, an intermediate 
advisory body acts in liaison capacity between the planning office and 
the President and his Cabinet, in which the major decisions are discussed 
and weighed» 
Table 1 lists the different policy-making and technical offices to be 
found in Latin America, and indicates their structure. The situation is 
less homogenous as regards the sectoral and regional offices since some 
countries have none, while others are still organizing them (see table l). 
As a rule, the planning bodies act in an advisory capacity to the 
top-level political authorities. They often have other duties, such as 
helping to prepare the annual national budget estimates* advise on the 
external financing of particular investment projects, and co-ordinate 
foreign technical assistance» 
1/ This analysis deals with the features common to the whole region, so 
that certain comments may not be applicable to specific countries. 
In particular, they do not refer to Cuba because the data available 








TABLE Í - BANNING AGENCIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
E/CN. 12/772 
Pago 
Country; 1) Year when 
f i r s t planning agenoy 
established a / 2) Date 
vhen present system 
established 
Agencies responsible for policy lines 
(Title and E-aborshlp) Technical agencies Sectoral agonolss Regional agencies 
Argentina 
1) l?6l 
2) September 1966 
National Development Council (CONADE)l President of Argentina 
and Ministers 
Secretariat of CONABE The Ministry of Public Works and Services and 
certain State enterprises rark out sectoral 
programmes 
Federal Investaent Counoil 
Bolivia 
1 ) 1953 , 
2) July 19É3 
National Eoonomio and Social Development Counoll (President of 
Bolivia and the Ministers with econoslic and social 
responsibilities) 
National Planning and Co-ordination Department 
(direoied by thè Minister of Planning and 
Co-ordination) 
w 
In the Ministries of National Eooaomy; Agricul-
ture, Livestock, Land Settlemesit end Irritation; 
Mines and Petroleum; Education and Culture; 
Rural Affairs; Health; and Labour and Social 
Seourlty 
In process of or^nization 
Brazil 
1) 1956 
2) July 1JÉ3 
Ministry of Planning and Economie Co-ordination. Consultative 
Planning Council (experts, press representatives, entrepreneurs, 
workers and state or regional devolopaent agencias). Advisory 
Group on Administrative Reform Studies;. Alliance for Progress 
Liaison Committee; and Fund for Financing Project and Programme 
Studies 
Short-term blaholng! Ministry of Planning groups; 
Long-term planning) Office of Applied Economic 
Research (EPEA) 
Sectoral planning sections in too Ministry of 
Planning. Specific bodies (e0g0 Executive Group 
for the Integration of Transport Policy) 
Ministry for Co-ordination of Regional 
Agenoles (for Federal regional planning 
Agencies). Departeent for the DsveJopmen-
of the Amazon Region; Department for the 
Development of the Nordeste. Planning 
bodies In almost al l states, dependent oi 
state governments 
Chile 
1 ) 193? 
2) Kovonber 1J64 
Economic Committee of Ministers, presided over by the Minister, 
of Finance. National Planning oMoe (ODEPLMJ) 
ODEPLAN Sectoral planning section of ODEPLAN. Sectoral 
offices In the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Housing, Education and Health; and In the 
Development Corporation (CORFO) for industry 
Regional planning section cf ODEPLAN 
Regional planning agencies (ORPLAN) 
Colombia 
1 ) 1 J51 
2) December ljé3 
National Council on Economío Polloy (the President of Colombia, 
the Ministers ulth economie responsibility, Chief of Planning, 
[imager of the Bonk of Colombia and Hanager of the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers), and the Economic Advisory Group 
( e i Ä t members appointed by the President of Colombia on the 
basis of nominations by trade associations) 
Planning Department Planning Committees (which establish the general 
policy, and ai*e presided over by the Minister 
Betarirjental Government! Advisory Council 
(policy) and Departmental PlanningSoriion 
(technical) . Autonomous DevelotmentCor-
porations! Cauoa, Magdal^ na and Slnu, ,th< 
Bogota savannah and Ubate-Chiqulnqulra 
Costa Hica 
1) 19«3 
2) January 1963 
Ministry of Planning* Teohnioel Committee for the Evaluation of 
Investment Projects (Ministes«, senior officials end private 
associations)• Consultative Planning Committee (Heads of 
Departments bi the Ministry of Flanning am representatives of 
private associations) 
Ministry of Pl&naiag. Planning Offioe In all Ministries and in the decentralized 
autonomous agencies -
Cuba 
1) I960 2) February I96I 
Central Planning Board (JUCEH.AN). pre aided over bar the Prime 
Minister, and consisting of tìie ianietera raspone}.bla for the 
oentral economic agencies 
Technical Secretariat of JUCBPLiH. Planning control 
ae t i f i t i osi ¡fettoœl Sank of Cube 
Each Ministry has to translate the instructions 
of the Central Planning Board into specific plans 
for each seotor and unit 
Co-ordinating Contre for Northern Orient« 
end Nucvltas 
Dominican Republic 
1 ) 1962 
2) Dorenbsf* 1JÓ5 
National Development Council (President of the Ropublio, 
Ministers of Finanoe, Public Works and Ccsaiunieations, Agri-
culture, Education; Health and Sooiel Voltare/ 0076709? of Ü13 
Central Bank end technical Sscretasy of the Office of the . 
Presidenti assodata memberss Katiorcá Flanning Diraotor eaa 
National Budget Direotor) 
SooSmiosl Saoratasdat of the Offioe of the President 
(direetad by & Technical Sec re-toy) 
In the Ministry of Agriculture. To bo 
established in Ministries with economio and 




2) August ISbZ 
Natioaal Board for Eoonomio Planning and Co-ordination 
(Ministers «Ith economic responsibility, the Managers of the 
Central Bank and the National Dsvalojaent Bank, and three 
citizens of note) 
General Offioo of Eoonooio Planning Programming offices in the Ministries of 
Education; Fublio Works and CoinunicationB; 
Indus-try and Trade; Sooial Welfare. Labour and 
Public Health; Finanooi and Agriculture and 
ment Centre (CEHDES) 
Centre for the Eoonomio Reconversion of 
the Austro; Board for the Eoonomio 
Recovery of Loja and Zamora-Chinohipe; . 
Centre for the Rehabilitation of KanaMi 
Development Boards of El Ore, Carohi and 
Eemeraxdas 
El Salvador 
1 ) 1962 
2) April 1962 
National Council for Eoonomio Planning and Coordination (Pre-
sident of El Salvador, the Ministers of Finsaoo, Eoonomio 
Affairs, Agriculture. Labour and Social Soourity, and Publio 
Works, ibePresident of the Central Reserve Bank, two repra-
sentatives of private enterprise, and the Executive Secretary) 
Technical Planning Office, directed by an Executive 
Seoretaffy 
Planning Committee are being organized In the 
Ministries of Publlo Works, Agrioulture, 
Education and Publio Health -
Guatemala 
1 ) 195^ 
2) November 195^ 
National Eoonomio Planning Counoll, Offioe of the President 
(the Ministers ef Labour and Ecmcme Affairs, Finance and 
Public Credit, Communications and Publio Wortes, Agri cui turo. 
Publio Health and Social Welfare, the Presidents of the Bonze 
of Guatemala and of the tastituta for U»é Development of 
Production, end three representatives of the President of 
Guatemala) 
General Seoroteriet of the Kati oliai Cotsneii of 
Eocstomle Planning - -
Haiti 
1 ) 1JÉ2 
2) July 1963 
National Planning and Development Department (COUaEJP) cœiAE? 
- -
Honduras 
1 ) 1955 
2) Ooiobor X965 
Higher Eoonomio Planning Counoil (Präsident of -Sia Hapubli«, 
Secretaries of State for Economies and Ptoanooj Cossamioatít»ip 
and Publio Works; Natural Resources; Presidents of «jo Con teil 
Bank and the Development BaakJ.oao repre a ostativo SVoa 
management and one rrosi labois'j 
îeohsïeol ef iho H? >^ej> Econooie Plasralng 
Council (direatoâ by est Esocutiira Seopotery tilth 
Biinlnioviel Faalt) 
In tho VAniotyy cf Agrioulture 
-
Mexico _ 
2) fcrah 1J62 
Liter-Ministerial Development Planning Ceaoittso (s^rarasen-tatlTOa 
of the Office or 'mo President end oit 'fao MiniBtey or yinasise an£ 
Publio Credi,«) 
TashaAocsl offioo of tho Intay-I-Knistoriai Cernaitteo lhe secretariats of the Ministries, tho 
aeoantralijaa agonoieo ana the a»tsri®4aos «i-ai 
State participation al l w«s3t out Inveofeont 
programmes 
National coosittess for 05>p,5ifio , 
projects (sogo the Pepsioajao Basin) 
Hicaraaua 
1 ) 1952 
2) Pobruapy ¿952 
National Eeononáo Counoil fffl.nlatopo of Eoonomio Affaire, 
binano e „ Development and Agriculture, thoProBidents of tho 
Central Bank and of the National Bank, and -aie Gsneral Ma&aGsr 
of the National devolopnent Instituto; Planning Offleo, Offioe 
of the President 
ïechaical Secretaf&at of v-ho National Sooaoslo Council 
[undo? 'tho Ministry for Ssonomio Affaire) 
Re search eAd programming offices Inmost cf the 
Ministries -
Panama 
t ) y » , 
2) Juna 1?5? 
General Offioe of Planning and Administration, OffSoe of the 
President 
(renerai Office of Planning and administration, 
lopartmeats of Planning Budget, Administrative 
Dr^niz&tloa and Personnel Administs-ation 
In the Mteistries of Education; Agrioulture. 
an! f y ^ i e 8eaitfi3'0ef labour, Sooial Welfare -
Paraguay 
I V W 
2) Ssptoaber 1962 
National Counoil for Economic Co-ordinatioa {President of 
?ara.Euay. the Ministers of Finanoe Mid Economic Affairs, aia 
Chairman and & representative^ o f t h ä Monetary Board of the Bank 
of Paraguayo Tao members of the Chamber of Representatives attend 
In a» aàviaocy oapaoii®'. S»e President oay appoint three other 
members) 
feohjiioal Offioe for Economie and Social Development 
Planning, Offioe of ths President (Executive Scoipotasji) - -
2) October 1962 
National Council for Economie and Social Da ve! o j a eat (Pr J si dent of 
Peru, t-anietei'E of Finanoe and Trade, Development and Public 
Uorkl, Education. Health and Social Welfare, Agricolture. Labour 
and Indigenous Alf airo, and the Aimed Services Departments ,^ and 
the Chief of the National Planning Xastitute) 
National Planning Institute (chase Chief has the rank 
of Minister), the AdvisoHr Planning Ciunoil (presided 
over ty the Chief ef the Institute, uith a membership 
of representatives of Gatrcpreneurs, uorkers, profes-
sionals and Universities) 
In t&e CiinlEtries of Labour and Indigenous 
Affairs; Publio Education; Development and Publio 
Works; Publio Health and Sooial Welfare; and 
of^ioe^ancl t h e ^ S i i o n ^ ' s t e o n o S I D a S S o p l ® t 1 ? S i d 
Offioe6 for tho planning of geographical 
and economio regions, and political and 
administrative divisions, are envisaged. 
There are development corporations for 
jUZC0|^|r||uipsL, Kadro do Dios, Taona, 
J p ^ w e o t e r 19?6 
Budget and Planning bifice (directed by a Committee made up of 
iommunloations and Tourism: end Cultures aiid presided over by 
the «¿rector of the Offioe) 
Budget and Planning bff&oe In'tho Mlnletrios of Agrioultare, PuSHe 
Education and Social Welfare; aad Publio Health -
Venezuela 1) 1958 
2) Daoeabor 1958 
Prosident of Venezuela, in 'She g^ncil of Ministers Jentrel Off J. e o íor Co-ordination and Planning MSeatoral offices in the Ministries and eutonoraúT 
! insti tu iionso Seaioral oo-ordination groups 
1 
The Venezuelan Corporation of Qua^cna; 
Conitteo to provote the development of 





3a The plans prepared 
In the majority of cases, the planning offices prepared "general 
medium and long-term development plans", for periods ranging from four 
to ten years» It was not long before nearly all the Latin American 
countries had such plans® The plan usually consists of a diagnosis, 
a set of projections and overall and sectoral targets, a statement of 
the particular social goals., a broad assessment of changes required and 
fields for the application of economic policys some indications concerning 
research and utilization of specific natural resources, public investment 
targets and estimates of external financing requirements» More recently, 
shorter-term plans have been drawn up, often on a biennial basis» 
Table 2 lists the plans that have been prepared in the different 
Latin American countries® Most of the long-term plans have also indicated 
at least in the form general statements of principle, the goals to be 
achieved in land reform, tax matters, education, administration, and 
national integration through infrastructural works (particularly roads 
and the opening up of new areas for agricultural settlement). In seme 
cases, a salient feature of the plan is a large-scale project to which 
2/ 
particular importance is attached«-7 On the other hand, specific 
objectives for income redistribution and measures or policies for 
unemployment and underemployment are seldom stated. 
2/ This applies, for instance, to big hydroelectric and irrigation 
works (Mantaro in Peru, Chocón-Cerros Colorados in Argentina), 
industrial complexes (Guayana in Venezuela) and roads (Carretera 
ilarginal de la Selva) that predated the plan, but were fitted 
into the general framework so that their significance could be 
assessed more accurately in relation to the rest of the economy and 
for the purpose of securing external financing. Some of those 
projects are now bein implemented while others are still bogged 






ESTIMA.TED GROWTH RATES OP TI® PRODUCT, IMPORTS, CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS IN THE 
iERIOD PRIOR TO THE PLAN AKD DURING THE FUN, AND ACTUAL RATES 
Gross domestic product 
Im- Con- In-Country Ex-







Pre-plan (1957-0) 0.5 -0.2 17.1 0.0 -0.5 -0 .6 2.6 5.4 
Plan (1965-69) 5.8 4.4 7.7 7 .6 4.7 5 .6 5.7 2.1 
Actual rates (l965-66) 3 »2 2.2 7.5 7 .2 -8.8 2.5 -1 .8 5.0 
Bolivia 
Pre-plan (1950-58) -0.2 0.3 -2 .4 4.4 0.9 0.0 Plan (1963-64) 6 .2 4.8 10.2 6.5 16,2 5.2 27.7 9.7 Plan (1965-66) 5.5 3.0 11.8 7.7 7.6 4 .0 10.5 12.0 
Actual rates (1963-66) 5.9 3.0 7.6 6.3 9.7 6.5 9.8 4.3 
Chile 
Pre-plan (1950-59) 3.2 0.0 0.3 7 .1 3 .8 1.3 1.7 Plan (I96Ò-65) 4.8 3.7 7.3 5.0 6.6 3 .9 12.0 5.5 Actual rates (I96O-65) 4.1 2.0 3.8 6.2 7 .0 3.7 10.1 4.6 
Colombia 
Pre-plan (1950-59) 4.6 3 .4 5-7 6.5V 1.2 4 .1 2.6 5.4 Plan (1959-64) 5.7 4.1 7 .4 8.6 7.2 4.4 12.9 4.2 
Actual rates (1959-64) 4.7 2.2 2.6 6.1 10.3 6.0 5A 2.3 
Ecuador 
Pre-plan (1950-61) 5.6 5.0 6.3 5.1 6.2 5.1 7 .4a / 7.3 P3 en (1964-73) 
Hypothesis I 6.4 4.7 7.2 8.6 4.2 5.4 10.3 4.9 , 
Hypothesis II 6.5 4.7 8.0 8.5 5.1 5.7 10.1 4.9 Actual rates (1964-65) 3 .3 1.0 2.1 4.5 5.4 5.1 2.3 -2.3 
Mexico 
Pre-plan (1958-61) 5.3 3.0b/ 1.1b/ 6.8b/ -0.2 4.3 5.2a/ 6.1 
Plan (1962-65) 5.4 4.5 2.6 6.9 8.8 5.5 8.6 4.8 
Actual rates (1962-65) 7«3 4 .4 4.7 10.1 9.3 7 .0 12.4 5.4 
Panama 
Pre-plan (I9Ö.-63) 8.7 2.4 22.5 17.3 15.2 7 .9 11.8 16.6 Plan (1563-70) 5.5 ... • • • ... 5.3 5.0 6.4 6.2 
Actual rates (1963-65) 6.5 7 .6 2.7 6.2 4.6 5.3 3.9 8.6 
Paraguay 
Pre-plan (1950-64) 3.2 3.9 25.0 6.9 7 .6 3 .0 5.4 6«3 
Plan (1965-66) 
Hypothesis I 4.7 4 .9 2.8 8.5 23.0 4 .2 22.0 14.0 Hypothesis II 5.8 ... • •• ... 29.0 5* 32.0 14.0 Actual rates (1965-66) 3.9 3.4 0.0 1.9 10.6 5.2 1.7 7.8 
Uruguay -
Pre-plan (1961-64) ?•? 2.0 */ 0.5 -4.7 - 0 . 1 -4 .2 5.0 Plan (I965-67) 
Aotual rates (1965-66) 















Pre-plan (1959-62) 2.6 7.7 3.9 5.1 -10.4 -0.6 -4 .6 5* Plan (1963-66) 7-6 7 .9 4.3 12.0 2.2 • •• • tl 4.6 Aotual rates (1963-66) 6.0 6.9 1.7 9.0 1.7 6.2 8.8 1.7 
Sources Dewloparanfc plans and EGLA, en ti» basis of effioial statisti OB. 
a/ Gross fixed investment» 
V 1950-58. 
0/ Goveremesit consumption. 
tl Iholuded in the industrial sector. 
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Page 7 
As an integral part of the overall plan or to supplement it 
various countries have prepared public investment plans for two or three 
year periods which, in relation to the general macro-economic framework, 
specify the sectoral investment, targets of Government agencies (the 
central government, autonomous agencies and, in some cases, State—owned 
enterprises), on the basis of draft or final projects, This is the 
kind of plan that has been most effective in bringing the planning 
offices into closer contact with the budgetary organs and in modernizing 
and streamlining government budgets. These plans have also proposed 
criteria for the allocation of resources to projects already under way, 
projects to supplement them or new projects, and have had to tackle the 
problem of distributing resources between productive investment* direct 
development expenditure, the expansion of current expenditure and investment 
expenditure in the different social services® 
Thus overall long-term plans have made a major contribution to the 
establishment of general development policy. Supplemented by medium-term 
plans, they have served to rationalize public sector activities. However, 
the countries of the region have not made an analysis in depth of specific 
short-term economic policy programmes which help to ensure that immediate 
action is compatible with the long-term objectives« 
The small number of annual operational plans, except for public 
investment schemes can be explained by various factors, including 
methodological shortcomings and inadequate descriptions of individual 
projects and failure to establish short-term economic policies» 
Experience with regard to regional plans has been varied, and the 
guiding principles observed in their formulation have not always been 
uniform. In some cases, for example, an attempt has been made to distribute 
some public investment targets of the overall plan among the various 
regions responsible for sectoral targets. In other cases, the policy has 
been to formulate a general programme, more or less unrelated to the 
overall plan, for an especially backward region or for a region with a 
very favourable combination of natural resources® 
/4* Gnpleiaentat ion 
S/CJJ.12/772 
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4« Implementation of plans 
Apart from the difficulty of assessing the various plans in terms 
of the actual expansion of economic activity, such an assessment may be 
meaningless in some instances, and in others may overlook or under-
estimate the contributions of planning* 
A case in point is afforded by the overall growth targets for the 
product and its major components. Table 3 presents, in relation to 
ten Latin American countries, the growth rates of the total product and 
of the agricultural, mining and industrial sectors, as well as of the 
aggregate components of demand (imports, consumption, investment and 
exports)j in each case, the rates envisaged in the various plans are 
recorded, together with those attained previously and those reached 
during the early years of the plan's operation. 
Although such figures would seem to constitute a factual basis for 
evaluation, it would be hazardous to draw final conclusions irom than, 
other than the very general observation that as a rule there is a 
relatively wide gap between the targets of the plans and actual economic 
trends« The extent to which the plans were politically supported, their 
intrinsic nature, the evolution of exogenous variables mainly relating 
to foreign trade and financing, and many fortuitous factors would require 
detailed consideration of each specific case, although many have features 
in common, such as those discussed in the relevant sections of this note« 
Much the same is true of the general lines of development policy 
followed in the plans. In most instances, they represent principles 
or proposals worked out before the plans were officially sanctioned and 
incorporated in them as decisions thus strengthening them and directly 
or indirectly helping to bring them into operation» Thus, although 
the progress achieved in certain fields may not be directly attributable 
to the content of specific plans, it is unrelated to all that the 
planning process involves® For example, since 1961 - when planning 
first became a widespread practice - agrarian reform laws have been 
passed by fourteen of the Latin American countries, and most of them are 
adopting tax legislation and improving tax administration with increasingly 
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National Development Plan, 1965a69« 
economic budget, 1966» 
National 
Economic and Social Development Plan^ 1962-71® 
Sectoral plans, 1963-64® Performance budgeting 
since 1961® Two year economic and social 
development plans, 1963-64 and 1965-~66e, 
Target plan (1957-60)e Three-Year Economic and 
Social Development Plan, 1963-65« Government 
Programme of Economic Action, July 1964-March 1967® 
Ten-Year Plan, 1967-76 (in preparation). 
SectercJ. short-term plans (power, steel, petroleisn, 
etc,). National Development Programme, 1961-70« 
Five-Year Development Plan (in preparation),, 
Performance budgeting since 1961® General 
Economic and Social Development Plan, 1962-70» 
Four-year public investment plans, (196I-64, 
1962-65). 
Performance budgeting since 1964« Economic and 
Social Development Plan, 1965-68» 
Plan for the National Economy (annual, beginning 
1962). 
Performance budgeting since 1964. Bases for 
national development (1966),, Two-year development 
plan (in preparation)» 
Bases and directives for the programming of 
Ecuador's economic development. Short-term 
development plan. Performance budgeting since 
1963. General Economic and Social Development 
Plan, 1964-73. 
Two-Year Public Investment Programme, 1964-65« 
Performance budgeting since 1 9 6 4 » Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1965-69). Annual public 
investment plans since 1966. 
/Table 3 (conclusion) 











Performance budgeting since 1964. Economic ana 
Social Development Plan (1965-69). 
Short-term plan (two-year investment plan), 
Emergency programmes (1966)«, 
National Public Investment Plan, 1963-64. 
Preliminary version of the Four-Year Economic and 
Social Development Plan, 1962-65. Performance 
budgeting since 1964. Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1965-69). 
Sectoral plans. Short-term plan, 1962-64. 
Development Plan, 1967-70 (in preparation). 
Performance budgeting since 1964. National 
Economic and Social Development Plan, 1965-69. 
Economic and Social Development Programme, 
1963-70» Perfomance budgeting since 1966» 
Performance budgeting since 1963» Two-year plans 
(1965-66 and 1967-68). 
Public investment programme, 1964-65 and 1966. 
Performance budgeting since 1963. Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1967-70). 
Economic Survey of Uruguay (1963). National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (1965-74). 
Four-Year Plan, 1960-64. Performance budgeting 
since 1963. Annual plan of operation (1964). 




From another standpoint, the preparation of plans has compelled 
more thorough study of each country's economic situation and investigation 
of the causes of its underdevelopmente The planning effort has been 
reflected in substantial improvements in the basic statistical data 
available, has encouraged surveys of natural resources, created greater 
awareness of internal and external financing problems and helped to 
identify the essential features of a Latin American development strategy® 
Although all this has not produced iamediat© and tangible results-? it 
implies a substantial though gradual change in the approach to problems® 
As the process ha3 been gradual, this change of attitude has sometimes 
escaped notice, but when analysed, it reveals a considerable difference 
between the approach to development problems adopted by Governments and 
the public today, and the situation a few years ago0 It has been rightly 
contended that the existence of a plan is less important than the fact 
that it has been worked out» 
One of the most direct and immediate results of development plans 
is the effort to rationalize the public sector* shown both in general 
policy and in the formulation of public investment plans, the use of 
programme and performance budget techniques and the evaluation of projects* 
The general principles set forth in the plans have served to 
elucidate the development process and to weld into a whole the many and 
various piece-meal measures involved in Government action« This does not 
mean that the decisions adopted have been strictly in line with the plans, 
but it does imply the existence of a yardstick to measure the deviations 
caused by unfavourable conditions and the extent to which favourable 
circumstances have been exploited» Furthermore, familiarity with the 
plans and public discussion of them at the national level, together with 
their evaluation by international technical agencies* have made for the 
inclusion of decisions requiring structural reforms® 
The rationalization of public expenditure has been especially note-
worthy in the countries where public investment plans have been drawn up, 
since sectoral budgets have had to be fitted into an overall concept 




and projects and preliminary projects for a two-year or three-year 
period» Although in most cases the quantitative targets established 
may not have been attained, this is probably the type of plan that 
has operated most effectively in Latin America, amoi^ j other reasons 
because it relates to one of the special provinces of the public sector, 
on which it is binding» 
The adoption of programme and performance budgeting has gradually 
superseded the traditional process and has resulted in the increasingly 
rational allocation of public expenditure and investment» The efficient 
operation of this sytem calls for conditions that have not yet been 
fully established (skilled personnel, reliable statistical data, 
identification of executive units, integration of the accounting systems 
of the public sector, costing and evaluation, channels of communication 
between the central and sectoral budget offices, etc«)« Nevertheless, 
in the countries where it is applied, budgeting and plsnning aye better 
co-ordinated at the budget programming stage, and budg*rs j .resented 
in a more rational forms At the same time, the processes of execution 
and evaluation of the budget are being brought into line with the new 
systea, and some countries already have adequate machinery for accounting, 
costing and evaluation of results» 
Where public sector projects are incorporated in an overall strategy, 
the process of evaluating them has necessarily involved assessing their 
relative importance, establishing a satisfactory order of priorities, 
considering the compatibility of projects and groups of projects and 
taking into account their direct and indirect effects on the economy as 
a whole. It has thus been possible to prevent, in part at least, situations 
such as have recently arisen in some countries, in which the haphazard 
launching of projects has led to disproportionately heavy external 




5« External technical co-operation 
External technical co-operation has without a doubt exerted a 
marked influence on planning efforts in Latin America* directly in sane 
cases and indirectly in others® It has been responsible for much of 
the headway made in overcoming limitations to planning« This influence 
has operated mainly with respect to methodology* training of cadres* 
the actual formulation of plans^ and the promotion of specific projects® 
Technical assistance in the field of planning methods was particularly 
important because the region was lacking in experience, statistical and 
technical data were not abundant, and the economic and social characteristics 
of Latin America did not make it easy to transplant methods used in other 
parts of the world« Consequently planning helped to develop an 
appreciation of the efforts of international agencies to secure a fuller 
and deeper understanding of the Latin American economies and their 
development problems* as well as the usefulness of their work ia programming 
and projection techniques* programme and performance budget;ia&,, and 
preparation and evaluation of projects® 
This applies to seme of ECLA's general studies,^ and to its 
subsequent analyses of overall programming techniques*^ its specific 
J/ See, for example, "The economic development of Latin America and 
its principal problems", Economic Bulletin for Latin ¿.lunrica, Vol« VII* 
K° 1| Economic^Survey of Latin America 1949; and Probligas teóricos 
y prácticos del crecimiento económico* United Nations Publications* 
Sales N° 1952»II«G«I (issued in English in mimeographed version only, 
under the title Theoretical and practical problems of economic 
growth (E/CN.12/221)). 
y See the provisional study on the technique of economic development 
programming, revised and reissued in July 1955 under the following 
title: Analyses and projections of economic development: 1« An 
introduction to the techniques of programing i United Nations 




studies on the development of a number of countries/^ and its discussion 
of programme and performance budgeting and project preparation and 
evaluation The Commission also helped to relieve the 
serious shortage of specialists in these subjects, by initiating 
training courses on development planning in 1952« These and other 
activities were considerably strengthened by the establishment of the 
Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning in July 1962» 
Its objectives were to strengthen the training programme, help Governments 
to initiate the planning process and carry out studies on basic development 
problems and planning techniques« 
The special impact of its training efforts has been reflected in 
the fact that only very recently have subjects specifically relating to 
planning and development been included in the regular curricula of 
Latin American universities® The first planning efforts wore supported 
only by spiall groups of technical experts trained under special, programmes 
de signed and implemented by international agencies® V^ hiJc ouch programmes 
could not take the place of previous academic training, th«vy have 
fulfilled a useful function by laying down general guidelines and 
providing the methodological tools required to cope with immediate 
responsibilities« Moreover, they have helped to bring together specialists 
i\J Analyses and projections of economic development: II-. 51 desarrollo 
económico del Brasilo United Nations Publications Sales N° 56«H«G«2; 
in» El desarrollo económico de Colombia» United Nations Publications, 
Sales N°: 57.II.G.3; IV. El desarrollo económico dp Bolivia. 
United Nations Publications Sales N°i 58«II»G.2? El ¿arrollo económico 
de la Argentina, Volpo I, II and III, United Nation« P. voi cat ions 
Sales N®r¿7oII VI,- The industrial develoraicvr, •;•; Peru« United 
Nations Publications., Sales N°j 59.H.G.2; VII« T£. • rollo económico 
de Panamá3 United Nations Publications Sales N°s 60.*IÍ.G.3; VIII, El 
desarrollo económico de El Salvador» United Nations Publications, 
Sales N°: 60.II.G.2; 3X« El desarrollo económico de Nicaragua (in 
the press); XI« Él» desarrollo económico de Honduras» United Nations 
Publications, Sales N°: 61.II.G.8. 
6/ The fiscal budget as an instrument in the programming of economic 
development (E/CN«12/521): Algunas consideraciones sobre las rela-
ciones entre la programación del desarrollo y el presupuesto fiscal 
(E/CN,12/BRVf«2/L*5): La experiencia de algunos países de América 
del Sur en materia de reforma presupuestaria (E/CN«12/BRW.2/L.10): 
Manual of economic development projects» United Nations Publications, 




with different technical backgrounds and experience (economistss engineers* 
sociologists* educators* doctors* administrators) for planning purposes 
on the basis of a minimum of common training and languagej, and to fit 
them for the team work that planning entails® 
The co-operation of SOLA* and later of the Institute has also been 
extended to cover the provision of advisory services fcr the purpose 
of organizing and establishing planning machinery and formulating plans» 
Several countries have obtained the cooperation of "advisory groups11» 
set up by these international agencies most often with the participation 
of the Inter-American Development Bank and the OAS Secretariat* or with 
occasional advisory services in specific fields»-^ Later., such services 
were also offered by official agencies or foreign foundations under 
bilateral co-operation programmes « 
In addition to these direct forms of external technical co-operation 
there are a number of different ways in which planning has enlarged 
in scope and made more effective® The panel of experts established under 
the agreements contained in the Punta del Este Charter* whoss .function 
is to evaluate plans and make recommendations on external financial assistance* 
was instrumental in improving plans and strengthening national planning 
systems» The Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress was 
subsequently established as a committee of the IntezvAn.-?ri ^-m Economic 
and Social Council to make an annual review of the economic situation 
and the implementation of plans in each country and to estimate the amount 
of external financing required» Its establishment was another milestone 
in the progress of planning in Latin America» The significant contribution 
of the Inter-American Development Bank to the development e:' the region 
took the form, inter alia,, of financing regional programmes* national 
planning organs and international and regional agencies engaged in planning» 
The expansion of the activities of international financial institutions 
(IBRD* United States Government agencies and others) has also stimulated 
the preparation of investment projects and helped to improve their quality« 
2/ Advisory groups were set up in Colombia (May 1959); Bolivia (April I960)] 
Haiti (end of 1961): Uruguay (March 1962); Paraguay (end of 1962); 




11» OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS 
Although planning in Latin America has made a number of important 
advances in certain aspects, it still h&s serious weaknesses and 
improvement of planning and implementation of plans is still being 
hampered. Recently, the planning process has been experiencing a 
period of stagnation, and in some cases can be seen to have lost ground. 
The impetus to prepare the overall plans has spent itself, and the same 
fervour has not been applied to the tasks of translating overall 
planning policy into specific economic Policy Programmes and short-term 
operational plans and establishing efficient instruments for the periodic 
review and up-dating of plans and the evaluation of their implementation» 
It is in such tasks that the various limitations and obstacles are 
most apparent. Some of them stem from internal factors, ranging from the 
most general, including the political stability amount of politic-sl 
support that planning efforts actually enjoy, to factors mcr-3 directly 
related to the actual operation of planning machinery. In /: aluating 
these latter factorss particular account should be taken oi the 
relatively short period of time that has elapsed since planning was 
initiated, and of the fact that in other countries efficient planning 
was the fruit of many years' sustained effort. Moreover, a number of 
other usually serious problems, arising from external factors, mainly 
related t.n instability and the limited development of foreign trade 
and inadequate conditions of external financing are impeding the 
attainment of planning targets in Latin America. 
It is more pertinent, therefore, to point to the obstacles now 
hampering planning in Latin America and to possible ways of overcoming 
them, than to draw up a balance sheet of progress made and existing 
limitations. 
/A. INTERNAL 
A. INTERNAL m m m m 
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1. The functions of planning 
Although the need for planning a® aa instrument for a coherent 
development policy has been generally accepted by Government, there has 
been no effective unity of aims as regards planning aims and basic priorities« 
Proa the beginnings a number of different attitudes emerged« In seme 
instances there was a tendency to regard planning primarily as an instrument 
for mobilizing external financial resources and as an additional requirement 
for international financial co-operation, thus emphasizing the urgency for 
some kind of plan and tending to highlight those aspects of the plan most 
directly related to foreign aid« In others, planning was seen from a 
professional and theoretical point of view as an instrument for shaping the 
structural changes essential to Latin America's development and an expression 
of an action programme by the various economic sectors aim at achieving 
economic and social gains which planning itself would help to formulate« 
Sometimes** planning was identified as a means of attaining lie,:-ted 
goal of more rational administration. In one way or another all these points 
of view were incorporated in the plans drawi up, but substantive aims of 
economic and social policy often were not reflected in specific decisions. 
The problem is particularly in?)ortant since the structural changes 
essential to the development Latin America confront U-t. planners with 
a task that is different and more difficult than planning in developed 
economies, where the changes required are usually less drastic and where 
there is a wider consensus on more issues« 
Moreover, those different outlooks have given rise to a destructive 
and sterile controversy concerning the planning most suitable for Latin 
America based on much confused thinking. It has been argued that "overall" 
or "macro-econcmic" planning should be abandoned and that efforts should 
be concentrated on building up a sufficient number of well-planned 
specific projects« On the other hand, where stress has been laid on 
planning as an instrument for formulating basic long-term policy, 
immediate problems have sometimes been neglected or differed for future 
study. Instead of attempting to co-ordinate efforts to define long-tern 
policy* which are indispensable to effect the wide-ranging changes 




implement that policy by immediate action, there has been a tendency to 
reject or underestimate one aspect and concentrate exclusively on the 
other.^ 
2. Political support for planning 
The need for planning the economic and social changes essential 
to the development process raises the problem of the political viability 
of Latin American plans and the amount of effective support required 
by the planning effort« The plans generally encounter resistance from 
sectors which feel threatened by specific measures or are exerting 
pressure for a larger share of national income. At the name time, they 
often encounter resistance from the traditional government administration, 
which is reluctant to institute changes and jealously guards its policy-
making power against any possible transfer of power which may imply 
reorganization of the administrative structure to facilitate the 
establishment of the policy-making machinery which plar*!ruig requires. 
Thus, plans inevitably suffer from serious obstacles ioririy; the 
implementation stage which cannot be overcome unless the go -.r-nrnKits 
provide ample and sustained support, a support which is not always 
forthcoming in Latin American experience» 
Moreover, apart from substantive reasons, the difficulties of 
successful planning arise to some extent from the mann?v in which the 
plan takes shape. In some cates, there was little or no communication 
between the technical planning officials and the government departments 
during the preparatory stages. 
8/ These and other problems touched upon in this note were the 
subject of detailed study at a seminar organized by the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social Planning and held 
in rlune 1965. In this connexion, see Discusiones sobre 





3, Participation of,the private ssctor 
The problem of political support is even greater where the private 
sector is concerned® Resistance from some garbs of the private sector is 
inevitable whenever plans incorporate decisions to institute changes 
affecting specific situations or interests* but there seems to be a wide 
margin of potential support which has not. oeen mobilised because of 
deficiencies in the planning process itself. 
In general^  there is a lack of coranunieation between planning 
organs and the private sector. Rarely is any attempt made, during 
preparation of the plan* to consult representative national opinion 
groups (parliament* political parties* trade unions* employers' 
associations, universities* etc.) or the sectors directly concerned 
(entrepreneurs* importers* exporters, consumer associations* etc«). 
This phenomenon* like others* arises partly because planning 
is not expressed in terras of specific economic policy measures vhich 
might induce the private sector to follow particular guide "Lines,. The 
private sector regards the plan as an overall review of the o.xvnomic 
situation providing valuable information on the intentions of the 
public sector, but the plan does not guide its activity by providing 
incentives or disincentives in the form of credit, trade or tax policy 
measures, for example. 
4, Operation of planning machinery 
The varying degrees of political support for planning, the poor 
definition of its functions and its relationship with the decision-making 
centres, and the limited participation of the private sectors, are not 
calculated to promote the more efficient operation of tne planning 
machinery. On the other hand its operational flaws and weaknesses make 
yet more remote the possibilities of forging closer links between the 
planning offices and the permanent decisions of the government authorities 
and other interested sectors. 
The opposition which is bound to arise from the traditional policy-
making organs, both among the political authorities and in the national 
administration as a whole* would seem to necessitate some sort of "strategy" 
for introducing planning machinery* which would obviate such friction as 
far as possible so that planning could be progressively built into the 
administrative structure and procedures. 
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In this respect, planning in Latin America has manifested serious 
shortcomings, Isolated as they usually are from the traditional channels 
of administration and decision-making, the planning officew have often 
been saddled with the responsibility of preparing a development plan with 
a minimum of guidance from the political authorities or none at all. As 
a rule, contract have continued to be sporadic and inadequate throughout 
the formulation stage, and the planning agencies have not been punctual 
in presenting the technical alternatives together with a justification 
and evaluation of implications, which would have required decisions at 
the political level. In the circumstances, the plan which has been 
drawn up has not been discussed in sufficient detail by the various 
government policy-making and executory organs, and therefore creates 
resistance in the Ministries and decentralized agencies. 
There have also been instances of an over-concentration of resources 
and activities in the central planning agency« While such a concentration 
was essential at the time, the result was that a high pre port., ion of the 
planning experts - who are in any case few and far between - vera grouped 
in this central office, and since the Ministries and autonomous agencies 
have done very little in the way of planning,that office has tended to 
assume direct responsibility for the preparation of sectoral plans and 
projects. 
While there would seem to be every justification for making the 
central planning office a division of the Office of the President of the 
Republic since the support of the Chief of State and his Cabinet is a 
sine qua non for the satisfactory operation of the central agency, this 
has not automatically guaranteed the institution the stability and 
backing it needs, or the maintenance of easy channels of ccuriunication. 
In some instances, a change of Government has halted planning processes 
that were making good headway, and in others it has pumped new life into 
efforts that seemed to be petering out. An attempt has been made to 
maintain communication through development councils or boards consisting 
of Ministers, high-level officials and technical experts. However these 
organs have not always served their purpose. In other instances they have 
done useful work in co-ordinating development policy with the work of other 




to peter out at the operational level for lack of proper direction and 
supervision» The absence of efficient sectoral and inter-sectoral 
co-ordination machinery means that the co-ordination achieved at the 
core of the system weakens or disappears altogether at th@ lower levels 
as a result of organizational and procedural deficiencies. 
The direct link between the head of the central planning office and 
the President of the Republic which exists in some countries seems to 
impart greater flexibility to the central planning agency by forestalling 
the difficulties inherent in the operation of pluripersonal bodies, which 
in Latin America have* as a rule* proved to be slow-moving and lacking in 
dynamism. It is observable* however* that when the technical director 
of the planning office does not have ministerial rank or a voice in the 
Cabinet, he finds himself at a definite disadvantage* and the central 
planning agency cannot discharge its functions efficiently, especially that 
of co-ordinating the public sector for purposes of implementing the plan» 
At the same time* the technical director in charge of the central agency 
is exposed to political pressures, and is often replaced when the government 
changes, since he is held responsible* whereas that responsability would 
otherwise be assumed by the planning council or board. 
The sectoral planning agencies are generally weak and faced with 
organizational and procedural problems. However* this is far from the 
rule in the various Ministries and decentralised agencies. They are 
often regarded merely as operational instruments for compiling statistical 
datai they are assigned routine duties which relegate programming activities 
to a secondary status, or they are used as agencies for the study of the most 
widely varying questions. They do not get the political support they need 
to carry out their functions, and are usually cut off from the central 
planning agencies, the operational agencies of the Ministry concerned, and 
the decentralized and autonomous agencies in their sector. 
Similarly* regional planning has had to cope with innumerable 
obstacles* not the least of which is the fact that political divisions 
and economic areas are not the same. Since the regions suitable as a 
basis for planning often comprise different political divisions* each with 
its own interests and provincial* state or local pressure groups* it is 




Furthermore, some provincial or state governments are riddled with 
administrative weaknesses or are not sufficiently active in promoting 
eccncuiic and social development. 
In the last analysis, those problems are simply so many corolaries 
of the general role that planning organs have been superimposed on an 
a±ilv.i:>trs.tive structure which has not been adapted to the demands of 
pli.i.'r.sd development policy. 
In recent years, several countries have established central 
organization and methods offices, which have assumed responsibility for 
administrative reform. In many cases, these central offices have had 
no connexion with the agencies of the planning system, or with those in 
charge of staff and budget administration. Action taken to promote the 
reform has nothing whatever to do with national development activities. 
Thus, although general planning efforts have indirectly served to focus 
attention on administrative streamlining this task has usually been 
undertaken independently of economic development policies. 
5» "Operability" of the plans 
In addition to the problems arising from administrative organization 
and the position of planning machinery within the administration, other 
factors help to widen the gulf between the planning organs and the policy-
makers. 
The trouble is, in essence, that the plans formulated thus far 
cover only a part of the planning processj in other words, the planning 
effort has not yet been carried through to a conclusion, either from 
the standpoint of the plans drawn up or from that of the establishment 
and operation of effective machinery for the periodic revision of plans 
and for the supervision and evaluation of their practical application. 
Many of the overall plans embody forecasts based on an improvement 
- sometimes substantial - in previous trends and on the anticipation of 
potential limiting factors. As a result, the overall plans leave a wide 
gap between macro-economic considerations and general principles and 
their implementation by means of specific policies (monetary, exchange, 
fiscal) and operational plans. At the other extreme, some plans for 
immediate action which have begun to operate merely enumerate partial 
proposals and certain specific projects often without evaluating them 




Hie lack of an effective "bridge" between the two dimensions of 
ths planning effort has been detrimental to the two types of'plan, in 
the first instance beeaus© it greatly detracts from their viability 
and in the second, because the plans fail to co&e to grip with the 
fundamental obstacles to development» This absence of an organic 
relationship between the long-tern general plan and the corresponding 
specific plans in terms of the use of the various instruments of 
economic policy and mobilization and allocation of resources^ is still 
one of the principal shortcomings of planning efforts in Latin America, 
It is as much the result of poorly conceived development policy 
as it is of failure to design.and implement effective short-term planning 
schemes, 
(i) Definition of development policy 
The lack of a clear definition of that policy is reflected in the 
fact that the growth targets of long-term plans are not usually expressed 
in terms of the employment, productivity and training of human resources. 
Despite the significance and magnitude of the under-employment problem 
in Latin America, most plans do not deal with it specifically and little 
attention is devoted to the occupational structure and educational 
pattern of the employed population. Similarly, due regard is not given 
to the supply and demand for labour, and the need to bring the economic 
expansion targets established in the plan into line with available 
manpower, and particularly skilled labour. The problem of sectoral 
differences in productivity and the assimilation of technology is hardly 
mentioned in the majority of the plans, and the relevant proposals are 
confined to the brcaiest generalizations, no attempt being made at 
analysis in depth. 
Much the same may be said in connexion with the continuing high 
degree of income concentration in Latin America, which is another factor 
exerting a marked influence on the region's development. The plans often 
allude to this problem in the diagnosis, and even go so far as to list 
certain general palliatives (absorption of unemployment* increases in 
productivity, and/or price and wage, tax, public expenditure and education 




specific terms, nor is due allowance made for the effects of the targets 
established in the plan and in the proposals for attaining them on 
income distribution. 
From another standpoint, although a broad and integrated view of 
development, in which economic and social factors are closely interrelated 
has been gaining wide acceptance in Latin America, there remains the 
specific practical problem of how to decide whether to allocate funds to 
particular "social services" (education, housing, and public health) or 
to apply them to enlarge the economic infrastructure and the immediately 
productive field of the economy« In the absence of objectives guidelines, 
decisions are influenced in the end by circumstantial factors, such as the 
power of the authorities responsible for the respective fields, or political 
considerations of the moment. Through force of circumstance rather than 
as a result of deliberate policy, social expenditure has been increasing 
proportionately in most Latin American countries, and this process has 
been encouraged by the direction taken by foreign aid over the last few 
years8 How far this concentration of effort can be maintained is a matter 
of conjecture, unless a similar effort is made to broaden the economic 
base which must sustain it» Moreover, serious doubts are beginning to 
emerge as to the effectiveness of certain kinds of social action on 
behalf of particular social groups, when they are intended to relieve 
shortages which really reflect more deeply-rooted problems of economic 
and social marginality. All this places a very heavy burden on those 
responsible for planning, who have neither sufficient experience nor the 
necessary technical machinery for discharging their responsibilities, and 
are hampered by the failure of Government to adopt the political decisions 
to support tfrems 
Finally, it should be pointed out that with the exception of Central 
America, most Latin American development plans have not explicitly incorporated 
the regional economic integration prospects in their plans as a variable 
affecting their development policies. Integration appears to be following 
its own course, along channels relatively far removed from planning efforts, 
Although there are several fundamental reasons for this phenomenon, it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that this separate development is also 
affected by the fact that economic integration would raise new problems 
and the technical planners do not have the necessary methodological 
instruments to cope with them. / ( i i ) short-term 
The second problem arises from the fact that countries have not yet 
succeeded in developing and activating the essential technical machinery required 
„to complete the various stages of planning so that general ®§onomic policy can b® 
translated into effective and immediate action0 
Despite considerable progress in improving procedures for allocating public 
sector resources by means of medium-term public investment plans and the us® of 
programme and performance budgeting techniques for the annual Government budget^ 
there are still acute problemse No comparable progress has bssn mad®D for @smwpl®e 
in working out annual operational plans* econoroic policy or in standardising 
annual economic budgets, etc0 
For examplej, in the application of public investment plans, there is a 
marked disparity between targets and financial estimates, either because thf t@5S 
reforms on which they sire based are not carried out to the extent or in the tiaie 
anticipated owing to delays in international financing or special problems of 
financing loyal cost, or because any unexpected shortage of financial resources 
Lin the public sector affects investment much more than current expenditure® T m 
operational capacity of the public administration to undertake new or increased 
(activities is often o erestimated because there are no proper criteria or machinery 
for evaluating it objectively, although there has been some significant progress 
in that respect«, On the other hand, there is a general tendency to underestimate 
the' volume of projects under way and, consequently, to underestimate the lack of 
flexibility in the allocation of resources because priority, save in exceptional 
circumstances, must be given to partially executed projects® 
The programme and performance budget has been adopted as the model for 
annual public sector budgets in most countries of the region^ and Uruguay's new 
political Constitution expressly stipulate? that the Executive must present a 
breakdown of the national budget by programmes® On the other hand, similar 
progress has not been made in the preparation of annual plans of operation^ an 
exercise regularly carried out only by Venezuela« The formulation of experimental 
numerical modols for the analysis of economic policy is being tried out chiefly 
in Venezuela and Chile» As regards national economic budgets, the only practical 
experiments thus far have been conducted in Argentina, where such a budget was 
drawn up and comprised a 3eries of quantitative estimates of the probable 
behaviour of the chief macro-economic variables - including private investment 
and of the compatibility of public expenditure with the situation and needs of 




Hie continuing wide disparity between the plans and the conduct of 
economic policy is usually most pronounced in countries suffering from 
acute and persistent inflationary pressures. Those countries are confronted 
not only with the practical problems associated with the level and system 
of prices, but with the substantive difficulty of reconciling the plan's 
objectives with the requirements of stabilization policies. Growing concern 
with this problem has led to the preparation of plans specifically designed 
for that purpose. However, most often two unrelated and frequently 
contradictory policies are superimposed on one another: the policy implicitly 
or explicitly related to development plans or based on them, and the policy 
intended primarily to stabilize prices. 
(iii) Procedures for controlling the implementation of plans 
The lack of progress in the formulation and implementation of 
operational plans is clearly demostrated by the non-existence of machinery 
for controlling the implementation of plans, evaluating the problems which 
arise and insisting on the rectifications which are patently necessary. 
Not only must actainistrative organs be established to assume those 
functions, but evaluation techniques must be developed which will be 
applicable to Latin American conditions. 
6. Specific investment projects 
Without discussing the spurious distinction made between plans and 
projects, which unfortunately continues to be the subject of sane controversy, 
there is no doubt that the lack of sufficient specific investment projects 
has proved a serious obstacle to the effective implementation of Latin 
American development plans. 
This subject was examined in detail at a recent seminar at which 
a number of suggestions were put forward, which might appropriately be 
summarized hereo^ 
One suggestion referred to the need for a very broad interpretation 
- particularly under present-day conditions in the Latin American economies -
of the "project" concept, covering every unit of activity capable of 
implementing a development plan. 
3/ The seminar in question was organized by the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning and was held in Santiago, Chile, 




The persistent shortage of projects despite the. progress achieved 
in certain immediate factors which are usually regarded as decisive, 
posits the existence of other root causes» It develops that the shortage 
of projects is merely another manifestation of the weakness of the decision-
making and Implementation machinery. The shortage of projects is no more 
acute than it was before in absolute tennsj quite the reverse® What seems 
to be happening is that traditional policies of unplanned development in 
one way or another provided incentives for public and private enterprise 
which led to the formulation of specific projects, some of them of marked 
important, There is still a continuous flow of investment decisions, 
some of whi'.'.h materialize in project form, .but planning has imposed 
additional a:id much greater demands» 
Firstly, projects are now required to meet specific investment 
objectives and targets stated in the plans and to fit. into certain overall 
straregies. In so far as they are not clearly defined, these objectives 
and that policy do not provide sufficient incentives for suitable projects, 
nor do they in themselves represent strategic projects. The ?cononi o 
integration of 1,3.tin America illustrates this points until th.-; political 
decisions have been taken and political agreements concluded at the 
appropirate levels, no public or private initiatives in the form of 
specific projects can be launched. 
Secondly, planning not only requires the initiation of a certain 
number of projects but also arranges then in the proper order of priority 
and determines the relationship between projects and groups of projects 
with due regard for their direct and indirect effects on the economy as 
a whole. 
Viewed In this context, the problem of promoting, identifying, 
preparing, evaluating and executing projects is closely linked with the 
establishment of an effective planning system and with the necessary 
administrative reforms. Naturally, the difficulties of translating a 
development strategy rapidly into operational plans cannot be disregarded, 
any more than the difficulties connected with the shortage of trained 




are drawn up,•a high proportion of investment capacity - particularly in 
the public sector - is tied up in projects in progress, which can only 
occasionally be replaced by other projects better adapted to the new plans. 
In other words, the maturation period of projects of a certain magnitude 
tends to be longer, as suggested by the experience of the Bank, which 
found that a large power of transport project may take from three to 
five or more years from the time it is decided to undertake the economic 
and engineering studies to the time they are completed and the financing 
of the project can be approved and implementation started. 
7. Availability of information 
Improvement of the planning process in Latin America is being 
hampered by problems of the availability and quality of the basic 
information on which it is based. The information is mainly, but not 
exclusively, statistical data. 
There are serious deficiencies in the quantity, quality and timeliness 
of data that are basic to planning. Moreover, full justice has not been 
done to the statistical function within the planning effort. In general, 
national statistical offices occupy a very subordinate role in public 
administration as a whole, their employees are frequently ill-paid and 
their staff unqualified. Very few have adequate financial resources or 
mechanical equipment for the efficient collection and elaboration of data. 
From another standpoint, there are gaps in the legislation making it 
compulsory to supply certain data and, above all, in the machinery for 
giving effect to that legislation. The various sectoral, regional and 
local statistical services are not sufficiently co-ordinated and national 
statistical programmes have not been drawn up. 
Problems have also cropped up un relations with the users, one 
being under-estimation of the information requirements of the public 
administration and private sector. Moreover, proper facilities have not 
been set up to enable the offices providing the data to use them as a 
guide in decision-making* Relations with the planning offices in 




when plans are already in course of preparation. These relations have 
never been systematized, let alone developed into a mechanism providing 
a permanent flow of up-to-date information that would facilitate the 
peiodic revision and evaluation of plans. 
The quality of the data is uneven, depending on the sector to which 
they refer. Foreign trade statistics are the most accural 3 .followed by-
population data, while data on domestic trade, services construction, 
road transport and unemployment are particularly poor0 When censuses 
are used as a basis for the work, there is a lack of continuity, one of 
the results of this being the preparation of a new industrial directory 
every time an industrial census is taken instead of the up-dating of an 
earlier edition. Delays are a common feature of the data processing , but 
in some cases attempts have recently been made to overcome this problem 
by using sampling techniques. Another shortcoming is the lack of a 
systematic and continuous series of indicators for tracing short-term 
changes in the econongr. Lastly, there is usually a long delay before 




6, EXTERNAL PROBLEMS 
The limitations and obstacles cited undoubtedly detracted from the 
effectiveness of planning, and can only be overcome by decisions taken in 
the countries themselves and by the progressive improvement of planning 
machinery. It should be noted, however, that the inherent at ion of 
Latin America's development plans has been hampered and is still being 
hampered by serious obstacles created by the evolution of trade and 
financial transactions with countries outside the region. 
These obstacles are known as "exogenous" factors, not only because 
they are largely beyond the country's control or because they arise from 
new circumstances which could not have been predicted when the plans were 
being formulated, but in particular, because they alter the economic 
context in which the plans must be implemented, 
A review of recent trends makes this situation quite clear. In the 
short space of time that has elapsed since planning activities first began 
to gain ground, several important factors have assumed considerable 
significance: the insufficient and unstable growth of exports, external 
debt commitments, the need to replenish gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
and « as a result of those factors - the irregular trend of imports and 
the urgency of a policy of import restriction, 
1, Export trends 
Exports expanded irregularly, as shown by the fact that the annual 
growth rates in terns of volume fluctuated between a high of 9,2 per cent 
in 1962 and a low of 2,2 per cent in 1964, while the figure for 1966 was 
4 per cent. These averages for the region as a whole, reflect occasional 
violent fluctuations in certain countries resulting in sharp reductions 
in absolute tenrs. 
Export trends in terms of current prices have been somewhat steadier. 
Nevertheless, thus far in the sixties, Latin America has lost a substantial 
proportion of its sh$re in world.trade. The sharpest drop was in its 
contribution to total United States imports from about 21 per cent in 




was also marked reduction in its share of imports by the European Economic 
Community (from 6 to 5.5 per cent) and the European Free Trade Association 
(from 5.4 to 4®2 per cent). These decreases have not been offset by the 
substantial increase in intra-Latin American trade® 
The recent trends were influenced by structural and institutional 
factors created by the preponderance of primary comaac"l+i-3s in Latin American 
exports and their scant diversification, and by the limitations, obstacles 
and adverse conditions which continue to affect world trade» Although 
the problem may arise in part from the shortcomings of national e/.:port 
promotion policies, serious imbalances are exacted to develop, judging 
from projections of the future value of exports on the b/.sis of trends over 
the past fifteen years and compared with the potential demand for imports. 
In the circumstances, by 1975 the trade deficit might well range from 
4,600 to 5,500 million dollars at I960 prices. This huge deficit will be 
further inflated by the sums required to finance outflows in the form of 
amortization, interest and profits, with the result that it would become 
imposible to obtain new inflows of foreign capital. 
2« External debt 
The gross inflow of foreign capital has reached high levels and 
increased rapidly in the present decade, as shown by the fact that the 
public external debt for the whole region rose from 6,100 million dollars 
in I960 to over 12,000 million dollars in 1966. 
This is not reflected in an equally large net contribution to 
Latin American development financing. On the contrary, net external 
financing - defined here as the balance on current account - has fallen 
off considerably as a result of debt commitments: from 1,100 million dollars 
in 1961 it rose to its peak (1,230 million) in 1962, declined steeply to 
500 million dollars in 1965 and recovered only partially in 1966 ( 950 million 
dollars). Variables which are strategic in the implementation of plans 
have no& only shown a negative trend, but have fluctuated very widely. 
The critical situation in some countries has prompted Governments to 
renegotiate the cumulative debt, consolidating and reconverting loans to 




considerable progress has been made in extending the scope of external 
financing to other fields of economic activity and in obtaining more 
favourable terms, although the interest rates on some foreign loans have 
increased in the last two years. 
In addition, loans are generally repayable over a very shoi»t period, 
A balance sheet of the position at 31 December 1964 shows that in 
accordance with the original repayment periods the debt wn3 made up as follows: 
18 per cent repayable in less than five years, 28 per cent in five to ten 
years and 54 per cent over more than ten years. But the repayment periods 
applicable at that time reflected a critical position: 47 per cent of the 
total debt had to be paid off in the next five years^  24 per cent in five 
to ten years, and 29 per cent over more than ten years, 
3» Other factors 
Other factors have further reduced the already feeble effect of the growth 
of exports on real import capacity: one was the need to build up international 
reserves to a reasonable level in the last few years, Latin America's gross 
gold and foreign exchange holdings in I960 amounted to 3,000 million dollars, 
but dropped sharply to 2,200 million dollars in 1962; a subsequent recovery 
brought them up to 3,200 million dollars in 1965. In other words, 
1,000 million dollars were used to build up reserves during those three 
years. Moreover, monetary liabilities, including balance-of-payments loans, 
were cut by 500 million dollars over the same period. In short, this 
meant a total reduction of 1,500 million dollars in the purchasing 
power of exports between 1962 and 1965. 
The evolution of the terns of trade has had a similar effect. 
Although the trend has not been particularly unfavourable during the sixties, 
the losses due to the deterioration in the terms of trade since I960 amount 
to roughly 1,000 million dollars for the region as a whole. Some countries 
have suffered more then others, Venezuela's losses amounting to 1,800 million 




4» Import trends 
The above factors described account for the irregular trend of 
imports, and in some cases have necessitated a policy of import restrictions« 
Thi^ weakened the possibility of increasing supplies that were urgently 
needed for the implementation of development policy and plans. 
The value of imports of goods and services in I960 was practically 
the same as the value of exports: about 8,600 million dollars. Not 
until 1964 did Latin America reach the 1957 level of imports (some 
9,300 million dollars)® It is even more significant that in recent years 
imports expanded more slowly than exports, the trade surplus being as 
high 
as 1,200 million dollars in 1966® In fact, exports amounted to 
about 12,000 million dollars, compared with 10,760 million dollars for 




like every process, planning must be developed and improved« Thus 
far Latin America has gone through the first stage; it has established 
planning agencies, prepared a variety of plans, worked out consistent 
development policies with some success, allocated public resources more 
systematically, trained a large group of professionals in new techniques 
locally and accumulated a fund of valuable experience. At the same time, 
it has encountered limitations and obstacles including general lack of 
political support for planning, inadequate overall development strategies, 
absence of effective co-ordination between policy and operational machinery 
and other more specific drawbacks» 
Measures to overcome those limitations and obstacles would represent 
a second stage of planning in Latin America, in which development plans 
would be better formulated and above all more efficiently carried out. 
Some conclusions from the foregoing analysis might usefully be analysed 
by national agencies and the competent foreign financial and technical 
co-operation organs» 
1, National planning machinery 
(a) The planning systems thus far developed should be completed by renewed 
efforts in many areas and, in particular, by: 
(i) establishing a closer relationship between overall guidelines 
and short-term operational machinery, preferably by drawing up annual 
plans of operation incorporating decisions to mobilize and allocate resources 
and implementing detailed economic policy; 
(ii) supplementing the process of formulating and implementing plans 
by that of periodic evaluation of results and establishing appropriate 
organs for that purpose, 
(b) Planning systems should be brought into line with long and short-term 
development priorities through action to co-ordinate national planning with: 
(i) Latin America's economic integration aims; 
(ii) through action to relate planning with the assimilation of new 
techniques, employment and training, income distribution and improvement 




(iii) through action to relate planning with ant i-inflationary measures® 
(c) Stronger co-ordination should be established between planning agencies 
and the political authorities, the national administration and the private 
sector by» 
(i) Carefully reviewing the relations between planning offices and 
top-level national authorities; 
(ii) Ensuring that administrative reform programmer allow for proper 
co-ordination between planning bodies and the general, sectoral or 
regional decision-making centres; 
(iii) Establishing or improving existing channels of communication 
with the various representative bodies of the private sector (political 
parties, trade unions, entrepreneurs' associations, etc0)0 
(d) Further research should be carried out to discover the most effective 
technical means of implementing the various plaming activities. The 
following questions should be urgently considered: 
(i) Methods and techniques for preparing annual plans (including 
such instruments as the national economic budget); 
(ii) Methods and techniques for evaluating and supervising the 
implementation of plans; 
(iii) Methods and techniques formulating development policy with due 
regard for maximum utilization of. human resources, the economic integration 
of Latin 4ro.ericas the redistribution of income and a reasonable allocation 
of resources between social and economic objectives» 
(e) It is imperative to improve data-gathering and data-processing so 
that reliable statistics and other data will be readily available for the 
preparation of plans and the supervision of their execution. To that ends 
(i) The offices which collect, tabulate and publish information 
should be given greater autonomy and provided with additional staff and 
technical resources; 
(ii) Basic programmes of urgently needed information should be 
prepared for priority action in order to ensure a steady flow of up-to-date 
data; 
(iii) Machinery should be devised and put into operation for providing 




2« Ei eternal technjcrl and financial co-operation — ' 
(a) Technical co-operation from international and other external sources 
in national planning activities should be encouraged. The new for such 
co-operation is greater than ever at the present stage, especially in the 
following areas: 
(i) The study and dissemination of the methods and techniques 
referred to above; 
(ii) The training of technical personnel in performing their present 
functions as well as those likely to become more important in the near 
future (annual plans, evaluation and supervision, etc.); 
(iii) The exchange of e;:perience between planning agencies in the 
various countries of the region. 
(b) The provision of technical information and specific projections 
concerning the following questions should be systematically co-ordinated: 
(i) The economic growth of the various Latin American countries; 
(ii) World market prospects, by groups of products and by specific 
products; 
(iii) Estimates of the developing countries' external financing resources 
and needs» 
(c) External financing has exerted a profound influence on national 
planning activities. It is therefore essential to continue the progress 
already achieved in the following ways: 
(i) By financing programmes of concerted action in many different 
fields, and, in particular, by replacing the old system of project 
financing by a new system which will ensure the overall financing of 
development plans and supplementary and compensatory financing needs on 
suitable terms. 
10/ The following conclusions contain no reference to foreign trade 
despite its importance in the execution of Latin America's 





(ii) By extending amortization periods and lowering interest rates 
on foreign loans| 
(iii) By allocating resources more flexiblys so that they are not 
made contingent upon the imported content of investments and can cover 
local costs; 
(iv) By more flexible use of external financing with a view to 
eliminating the conditions attached; 
(v) By financial support for national and international planning 
agencies» 
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